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Abstract We study the relationship between the amount of managed
earnings and firms’ earnings performance and expected growth in a
reporting model, where managers manipulate earnings to influence the val-
uation of firms’ equity while bearing a cost that is increasing and convex in
the amount of managed earnings. In the unique revealing equilibrium to the
model, firms with higher performance and growth over-report earnings by a
larger amount because price responsiveness increases with earnings perfor-
mance and growth. And earnings quality, defined as the proportion of true
economic earnings in total reported earnings, increases with earnings per-
formance but decreases with earnings growth. We conduct empirical tests on
a large sample and a restatement sample using different proxies for earnings
management. Results from the large sample tests support our predictions
while results from the restatement sample tests are mixed. Our study pro-
vides an alternative explanation to the positive relationship between dis-
cretionary accruals estimated from the Jones model and firms’ performance
and growth.
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Earnings management has attracted extensive research in the accounting
field.1 Most research in this area requires a proxy for the amount of managed
earnings.2 Typically researchers use empirical models to decompose total
accruals into non-discretionary accruals and discretionary accruals. Discre-
tionary accruals are then used as a proxy for earnings management and are
linked to different potential incentives3 or used as a measure of earnings
quality.
The most widely used discretionary-accruals models are variations of the
Jones model.4 Prior empirical studies find that discretionary accruals esti-
mated from these Jones models are correlated with performance and ex-
pected future earnings growth. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) and
Kasznik (1999) document that discretionary accruals estimated from the
Jones model are positively related to return of assets. McNichols (2000)
further shows that discretionary accruals from both the Jones model and
the modified Jones model are positively related to analysts’ forecasts of
long-term earnings growth. The conventional explanation for the evident
relationship between discretionary accruals and firms’ performance and
growth is that Jones models are mis-specified in identifying discretionary
accruals. However, to draw the conclusion of mis-specification from the
existence of the relationship, an implicit assumption is required, that is, the
amount of managed earnings should have no relationship with firms’ per-
formance or growth. So far, no theoretical or empirical research has studied
the validity of this assumption. As noted in Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b,
p. 30), this assumption ‘‘can be challenged on logical grounds and, some-
what circularly, on the grounds that no evidence in the empirical literature
supports this assumption.’’5
The research objectives of our paper are twofold. First, we suggest a
rational setting in which the optimal amount of managed earnings is positively
related to firm’s performance and growth. In our model, managers manage
earnings to influence stock price. The endogenously determined market
response to reported earnings is more sensitive for firms with higher
1 For detailed discussions of earnings management literature, see Healy and Wahlen (1999),
Kothari (2001), Schipper (1989), and other review papers.
2 An exception is Burgstahler and Dichev (1997b), who examined the distribution of reported
earnings and used the discontinuity around specific thresholds as evidence of earnings manage-
ment. However, this research method cannot identify the amount of managed earnings (see Healy
& Wahlen, 1999).
3 Popular incentives include market based incentive, debt covenant, bonus and political costs. See,
for example, Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), Rees, Gill, and Gore (1996), Teoh, Welch, and Wong
(1998a, b) etc.
4 These include the time-series Jones model (Jones, 1991), cross-sectional Jones model (DeFond
& Jiambalvo, 1994) and modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995).
5 Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003b) suggested that the amount of managed earnings could be
positively relates to firm’s performance and growth and used it to explain the asymmetry in the
distribution of analysts forecast errors. Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari, Leone, and Wasley
(2005) also recognized the possibility. However the above studies do not provide analytical
explanations or direct empirical evidence for the existence of the relationship.
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performance or growth potential, which gives managers of these firms greater
motivation to overstate earnings. Second, by conducting empirical tests on two
data sets using different proxies for the amount of managed earnings, we
provide evidence supporting our theory.
We study a one-period model in which there is a risk-neutral manager and a
competitive and risk-neutral equity market. After privately observing the
economic (true) earnings, the manager chooses the level of reported earnings
to maximize his utility, which is an increasing function of the equity’s market
value. The amount of managed earnings is defined as the difference between
reported earnings and true earnings.6 The manager has to bear a cost for
earnings management and the cost is increasing and convex in the amount of
managed earnings. Without the ability to observe the true earnings, the
market evaluates the firm’s equity according to its expectation of the true
earnings conditional on the observed reported earnings.
In the unique revealing equilibrium in our model, the manager truthfully
reveals the economic earnings when it is less than 0 and manipulates earnings
upwards when the economic earnings is positive. The firm’s equity price is 0
when reported earnings is negative and when the reported earnings is positive,
the equity price is a strictly increasing function of reported earnings. Since the
economic earnings is the only private information that the manager has, in
equilibrium the market fully filters out the earnings management and correctly
prices the firm’s equity.
Because of the convexity of the cost function, it would be much more costly
for managers with higher reported earnings to maintain the same proportion
of managed earnings. The market rationally expects this and the sensitivity of
price response to reported earnings (price responsiveness hereafter) increases
with reported earnings, which induces managers with higher economic earn-
ings to overstate earnings by a larger amount. However, the speed of increase
in managed earnings in equilibrium is less than the speed of increase in
reported earnings. As a result, there are less managed earnings in each extra
dollar of reported earnings, which in turn justifies the increasing price
responsiveness. In our equilibrium, the amount of managed earnings also
increases with the firm’s expected earnings growth. Because the market uses a
dividend discount model to value the firm’s equity, firms with higher growth
rate have higher price responsiveness which triggers larger amount of man-
aged earnings. Our predictions are consistent with evidence from Abarbanell
and Lehavy (2003a), where the authors find that firms with higher stock price
sensitivity to earnings news (proxy using higher level of stock recommenda-
tions) have higher unexpected (discretionary) accruals.
We propose a new definition of earnings quality: the proportion of true
economic earnings in total reported earnings. In prior studies, the amount of
managed earnings is widely used as the measure of earnings quality. Under
6 The definition of amount of managed earnings is the same as ‘‘reporting bias’’ in Fischer and
Verrecchia (2000). Our definition of is also consistent with that in Schipper (1989), who defines
earnings management as disclosure management that intervenes in the external financial reporting
process with the intention of obtaining some private gain.
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this definition, firms with lower earnings quality (i.e. with larger amount of
managed earnings) may actually have higher price responsiveness because a
seemingly large amount of managed earnings may only represent a small
percentage of total reported earnings. Our definition provides a new per-
spective of earnings quality, which is more consistent with price responsive-
ness. Our model predicts that earnings quality increases with firms’ reported
earnings and decreases with firms’ expected growth.
We conduct empirical tests based on two samples using different proxies for
the amount of managed earnings. The first sample contain all firm years
during 1988–2001 with necessary information and the proxy for the amount of
managed earnings is discretionary accruals from Kang and Sivaramakrish-
nan’s (1995, hereafter KS) model. KS (1995) model uses additional controls
over non-discretionary accruals compared with Jones models without directly
controlling reported earnings or expected growth. KS (1995) also enables us to
use a large sample to test our predictions about earnings quality, which has
never been tested before. The second proxy for the amount of managed
earnings is the restated amount of earnings (reported earnings announced
initially—reported earnings restated) hand-collected from restatement
announcements identified as results of accounting irregularities. Because the
restated amount usually comes from investigations conducted by outside
auditors, the SEC, or firms’ internal auditors, it is unlikely to have the same
type of measurement errors caused by model mis-specification. Tests on both
samples provide consistent results that the earnings performance positively
relates to the amount of managed earnings and earnings quality. However, for
the effects of expected growth, we find mixed results. Results from the large
sample are consistent with our prediction that the expected growth is posi-
tively related to the amount of managed earnings and negatively related
to earnings quality. However, results from the smaller restatement sample
concerning growth are not significant, possibly due to the lack of test power.
Our paper has implications for empirical studies in earnings management.
Our model suggests that firms’ performance and growth are important factors
affecting the amount of managed earnings. Fully filtering out the discretionary
accrual associated with performance or growth will not only reduce the test
power and but also bias downwards the amount of managed earnings for firms
with better performance or higher growth. Our model suggests whether the
performance or growth should be controlled depends on research objectives.
If the research objective is to measure the level of earnings management and
link it to market efficiency or compare earnings management level among
individual firms within a sample (e.g. all IPO firms), eliminating the effect of
performance or growth may result in a biased measure. If the research
objective is to test whether some events (e.g. IPO or SEO) trigger higher level
of earnings management, controlling firms’ performance and growth would be
necessary. As illustrated in Dechow et al. (1995), not controlling performance
and growth would cause omitted variables problem even if performance and
growth affect earnings management.
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We organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 1 discusses related
theoretical literature. Section 2 describes the setup of the model and proves
the existence of the equilibrium. Section 3 derives the properties of earnings
management and earnings quality through static analysis. Section 4 empiri-
cally tests the predictions of the model. In Section 5, we conclude the paper.
1. Related theoretical literature
In this section, we briefly discuss prior theoretical models related to our study.
Related empirical studies will be discussed when we present the comparative
static results.
We follow the line of research where earnings management is studied in a
valuation setting,7 in which reported earnings is used for valuation purposes
and managers’ compensation is linked to firms’ equity value. In these studies,
the form of managers’ compensation contract is taken as exogenously given
and rational expectations of both managers and the market are considered.
Stein (1989), using a stable state ‘‘signal jamming’’ model,8 demonstrates that
even a fully efficient market could lead managers who care about stock price
to behave myopically. We inherit the ‘‘signal jamming’’ framework, in which
the market is not fooled but the manager is ‘‘trapped’’ in earnings manage-
ment. We drop the assumption of constant earnings management and dem-
onstrate that in equilibrium with rational expectation, the amount of managed
earnings could be correlated to firm’s earnings and perceived future growth.
Our paper also relates to Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), Fischer and
Stocken (2004), and Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). Fischer and Verrecchia
study the relation between earnings management and value relevance of re-
ported earnings. Fischer and Stocken focus on the influence of the speculator’s
information on earnings management behavior and stock price efficiency. Our
model is different from theirs in three ways. First, they introduce a noise to the
motivation of earnings management, so the equity market could not fully back
out the amount of managed earnings. In contrast, there is no uncertainty
concerning managers’ objective function in our model. Second, we drop their
assumption of a linear pricing function and instead assume that managers have
limited liability. This enables us to examine the relation between the amount
of managed earnings and firm’s performance. Third, we have different inter-
pretations for price responsiveness. Price responsiveness in our model
captures the quality of reported earnings and reflects the market’s rational
‘‘backing out’’ process, while in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) the price
responsiveness reflects value relevance of reported earnings. Abarbanell and
Lehavy (2003a) study the effect of stock price sensitivity on the incentives of
7 Another line of literature studies earnings management in an agent-principle problem setting.
Representative work includes Arya, Glover, and Sunder (1998), Demski (1998), Demski, Frimor,
and Sappington (2004), Dye (1988), Evans and Sridhar (1996), and Liang (2004).
8 Signal jamming model has also been employed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Holmstrom
(1982).
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earnings management. They present an intuitive model, which considers the
existence of earnings targets. Our model couldn’t address the issue of earnings
targets, however we incorporate the rational expectation from both the
market and the manager in a more rigorous setting.
Our model adds to a group of one-period earnings models.9 Like other
models using the one-period framework, our model cannot address earnings
management with inter-temporal nature such as earnings smoothing, the
reversal of accruals, and reputation maintenance incentives.10 However, not
all earnings management is inter-temporal in nature. For instance, both the-
oretical and empirical studies indicate that managers use classification shifting
to boost the core earnings.11 Unlike accrual management or the manipulation
of real activities, classification shifting only affects the earnings of a single
period. In addition, even though the reversal of accounting manipulations is
often assumed, we do not really know how long it takes. Empirical studies
(Leone & Horn, 1999; Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993; Pourciau, 1993) docu-
ment that negative discretionary accruals often occur after management
turnovers, which implies that managers may be able to manipulate earnings
upwards without a full reversal throughout their tenure with the company.12
Another limitation of our model is that it doesn’t provide explanations for
the downward earnings management. In our one-period model, because
manager would be better off from higher stock price, they have no incentives
to manage earnings downwards. Models considering inter-temporal earnings
management provide rationales for downward earnings manipulation. Our
model applies to cases when firms face a clear motivation to inflate reported
earnings, for example, in periods before firms’ SEO, IPO, and stock acquisi-
tions or before the execution of managers’ options. Managers may need to
manipulate down the reported earnings to rebalance the accrual, but it is not
likely to happen in those periods. Dechow et al. (1995) find that firms with
negative reported earnings have negative discretionary accruals. We would
like to point out that all variations of the Jones model use the error term of an
OLS regression as the proxy for discretionary accruals, which assumes
implicitly that within every industry-year (quarter), the average discretionary
accruals is 0. Therefore, discretionary accruals could only be a relative
9 Such models include Baiman, Evans, and Noel (1987), Demski and Dye (1999), Evans and
Sridhar (1996), Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2004), Newman and
Sansing (1993), and Verrecchia (1986).
10 A group of studies focus on the managers’ inter-temporal earnings management. These study
include Chaney and Lewis (1995), Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), Kirschenheiter and Melumad
(2002), Ronen and Sadan (1985), Sankar and Subramanyam (2001), and Trueman and Titman
(1988).
11 McVay (2005) shows that managers shift expenses from core expenses (cost of goods sold and
selling, general, and administrative expenses) to special items. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) find
evidence that managers exclude some corporate expenses when releasing street earnings. Dye
(2002) studies a model of ‘‘classifications manipulation’’ in which accounting reports consist of one
of two binary classifications.
12 The negative discretionary accrual may also come from the ‘‘reserve creating’’ behavior of the
new managers.
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measure of earnings management within a particular industry-year (quarter).
When we have an observation with a negative discretionary accrual, we only
know that the level of earnings management is below industry average. But we
cannot tell whether the manager is manipulating upwards or downwards the
firm’s economic earnings.
2. The model
2.1. Model setup
Our model is a one-period game with two players: a risk-neutral manager of
an all-equity13 firm and a competitive, risk-neutral equity market. The firm
yields economic earnings of ~x for the period. ~x is a random variable that is
distributed over (1; þ1). If the firm is not liquidated at the end of the
period, we assume that its future economic earnings exhibit a constant growth
rate, i.e. xtþ1 ¼ ð1 þ gÞxt.14 During the period, the manager privately observes
the realization of the firm’s true economic earnings x, and then releases re-
ported earnings r. The manager is not restricted to truthfully reveal the true
economic earnings. We define the amount of managed earnings as the dif-
ference between reported earnings and firm’s economic earnings: m ¼ r  x.
The equity market cannot observe the realized economic earnings therefore
prices the firm’s equity based on the reported earnings. We assume that the
firm’s liquidation value is 0. Because of the limited liability of equity holders,
the equity market prices the firm as:
p½r ¼ Max½E½v r; 0j
where E½v rj is the expected firm value when the firm is not liquidated. If at the
end of the period E½v rj \0, the firm will be liquidated and equity holders will
get nothing.
When the equity market is perfectly competitive and risk-neutral, E½v rj is
the rational expectation of the discounted value of all future cash inflows,
conditional upon the reported earnings r:
E½v rj ¼ E½~x rj  ð1 þ dÞ
d  g
where E½~x rj is the expected economic earnings conditional on reported
earnings of r, d is the firm’s cost of capital and g is the perceived sustainable
growth rate of earnings and d[g.
13 Assuming the firm is an all-equity firm is just for simplicity. Our model and analysis can easily
extend to firms with debt.
14 In our model, economic earnings x refers to firms’ core earnings, which would reoccur with a
constant growth rate. x does not include extraordinary items.
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We assume that the manager benefits from a higher stock price and bears a
cost when r 6¼ x. For every value of x, the manager chooses a level of r to
maximize the following objective function:
Max
r
ap^ðrÞ  cðr  xÞ2
where ap^ðrÞ represents the manager’s benefit by reporting r and we refer a as
the ‘‘compensation coefficient.’’ In this paper, we set a[0, because on average
managers benefit more from a higher stock price. For instance, managers
would try to boost the stock price before IPO, SEO or before stock acquisi-
tions if their interest lies with the existing shareholders’.15 Also if managers’
compensation package includes stock options or stock holdings, a higher stock
price grants him higher compensation for that period.16 p^ðrÞ is the pricing
function that the manager expects the market would use.
cðr  xÞ2 represents the cost that the manager has to bear when reported
earnings r differs from x. The cost of earnings management could be
resources and time spent on managing earnings. Managers also have to face
the potential reputation loss, financial penalty, and legal liability, in case
authorities discovered the earnings management. We adopt a quadratic cost
function to capture the feature that both the cost and the marginal cost of
earnings management are increasing in the amount of managed earnings.
The convexity of the cost function is essential to the results of our model.
And we feel that this assumption is reasonable. First, given the materiality
principle, only those ‘‘significant’’ earnings management would attract
auditors’ or regulator’s attention, which indicates the probability of being
detected is convex in the amount of managed earnings. Beneish (1997) finds
that firms within the top deciles of total accruals identified 59 of the 64
GAAP violators of their sample. Second, even the probability of being
detected is simply increasing but not convex in the amount of managed
earnings, the cost function could still be convex as long as the penalty of
earnings management is positively related to the amount of managed
earnings. This is consistent with the evidence in Palmrose, Richardson, and
Scholz (2004), who document that the market return around restatements is
positively related to the restated amount. Third, with the increase of earn-
ings management, the available accounting tools become less; therefore
more resources and time are needed to manage the same amount of
15 For instance, Teoh et al. (1998a, b) found that managers manage earnings up prior to IPO and
SEO, and Erichson and Wang (1999) documented earnings management before stock mergers.
Managers sometimes will benefit from lower stock price, as in management buyout or stock
repurchase. Our model does not apply to those situations.
16 For studies on the association between earnings management and management stock option or
stockholdings, see Bergstresser and Philippon (2004), Berns and Kedia (2003), and Cheng and
Warfield (2005). According to Bergstresser and Philippon, the median exposure of CEO wealth to
firm stock price tripled between 1980 and 1994, and doubled again between 1994 and 2000. Core,
Guay, and Verrecchia (2003) also document the same trend.
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earnings. Forth, the quadratic cost function is widely used in the literature
(e.g. Fischer & Stocken, 2004; Fischer & Verrecchia, 2000).
2.2. The equilibrium
The equilibrium of our model consists of a continuous reporting function rðxÞ
for the manager and a continuous pricing function pðrÞ for the market such
that three conditions are satisfied:
First the manager’s choice of reporting function must maximize the
objective function given his or her expectation of how the market responds to
the report:
rðxÞ 2 arg maxðap^ðrÞ  cðr  xÞ2Þ
The first order condition of the manager’s objective function is:
FOC : ap^ðrÞ  2cðr  xÞ ¼ 0 ð1Þ
Second, for a certain level of reported earnings, the market forms a con-
jecture about the amount of managed earnings m^ðrÞ and prices the firm
accordingly:
pðrÞ ¼ Max 1 þ d
d  g  ðr  m^ðrÞÞ; 0
 
ð2Þ
Finally both the manager’s and the market’s conjecture are rational:
p^ðrÞ ¼ pðrÞ ð3Þ
and
m^ðrÞ ¼ mðrÞ ¼ r  xðrÞ ð4Þ
where xðrÞ is the inverse function of rðxÞ.17 We refer mðrÞ as manager’s
earnings management function.18
Proposition 1 There is a unique revealing equilibrium to the game. The
pricing function has the following form:
17 For now we assume the relation between r and x is one to one. Later we are going to show that
this assumption is satisfied in the revealing equilibrium.
18 The manager observes x, chooses an amount of managed earnings m and reports earnings as r.
We express m as a function of r because mathematically it is easier to get the expression of m in r
and empirically r is observable.
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pðrÞ ¼
a
2cb2
e
2cb
a r  1
 
þ rb ; when r  0;
0; when r\0;
(
ð5Þ
And the earnings management function has the form of:
mðrÞ ¼  a2cb e
2cb
a r þ a2cb ; when r  0;
0; when r\0;

ð6Þ
where b ¼ dg1þd.
In equilibrium, the manager truthfully reveals the economic earnings when
the economic earnings is less than 0 and manipulates earnings upwards
when the economic earnings is positive. The firm’s equity price is always 0
when reported earnings is negative, and when the reported earnings is posi-
tive, the equity price is a strictly increasing function of reported earnings.
Because the true earnings is managers’ only private information, in our
revealing equilibrium the market fully filters out the amount of managed
earnings and correctly prices the firm’s equity.
First, it is easy to see that in a revealing equilibrium if the manager observes
x  0, he will truthfully reveal the true earnings as the reported earnings. This
is because if he chose reported earnings r 6¼ x, in a separating equilibrium the
equity market would fully expect this behavior and find out that x  0 and
price the equity as 0. The manager would be better off by reducing the amount
of managed earnings to 0, because the cost of earnings management would be
the lowest and the equity price couldn’t be lower than 0.
If the manager observes x  0, he or she chooses certain reported earnings
r. From Eqs. 1 to 4 we have the following differential equation:
ap0r þ 2cbp  2cr ¼ 0 ð7Þ
We assume that reported earnings is continuous on ð1;þ1Þ. Because we
have proven that r ¼ x when x  0, we have the initial condition:
pðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ 0: ð8Þ
In Appendix A, we prove that when r  0, the pricing function in a
revealing equilibrium has the unique solution as described in Eq. 5. Plug Eq. 5
back to Eq. 1, we get an expression for the amount of managed earnings in
terms of reported earnings as described in Eq. 6.
3. Comparative static analysis
In this section, we conduct static analysis of the equilibrium. Specifically, we
investigate how the firm’s observable characteristics (reported earnings
performance and perceived future earnings growth) relate to the amount of
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managed earnings, earnings quality and price responsiveness to reported
earnings.19 Our analysis focuses on firms with positive reported earnings,
because in the unique equilibrium, when reported earnings is negative the
manager does not manage earnings and the price is always 0.
3.1. The amount of managed earnings
We first examine the relation between the amount of managed earnings and
reported earnings. The amount of managed earnings is measured as in Eq. 6.
Taking the first order derivative with respect to r, we get:
@m
@r
¼ e2cba r[0 ð9Þ
The above inequality implies that the amount of managed earnings will
increase with reported earnings. In other words, for each extra dollar of re-
ported earnings, part of it will be managed earnings. The underlying reason is
that because of the convexity of the cost function, it will be more costly for the
manager with higher level of reported earnings to keep the same proportion of
managed earnings in it. This is rationally expected by the market, so price
responsiveness ( ap0ðrÞ, which is also the marginal benefit of earnings man-
agement) increases with reported earnings in equilibrium. To make the
marginal cost 2cðr  xÞ equal to the marginal benefit, the manager will choose
a larger amount of managed earnings.
Let a ¼ a2cb. If we take the derivative of m with respect to a, we get:
@m
@a
¼ 1  1 þ r
a
 
e
r
a[0 ð10Þ
where a ¼ a=ð2cbÞ, and b ¼ ðd  gÞ=ð1 þ dÞ.
Proof See Appendix A.
Equation 10 indicates that the amount of managed earnings increases with
the compensation coefficient a, decreases with the cost coefficient c, and in-
creases with the firm’s perceived future growth rate g. The economic meaning
is as follows: When the manager’s compensation plan is more sensitive to the
firm’s stock price, or when the growth rate of the firm is higher (which causes
stock price to be more sensitive to firm’s reported earnings), the marginal
benefit of earnings management is higher, which induces larger amount
of managed earnings. In contrast, when the cost coefficient is higher, the
19 We conduct comparative static analysis with respect to r, because first r is observable by the
market and x is not; and second it is not easy to get an expression of the earnings management in
terms of x. In equilibrium, when r\0; x ¼ r: When r[0, we have an exponential pricing function,
which is strictly increasing in reported earnings. Because p ¼ x=b; x is also strictly increasing in r.
Therefore, the implicit function linking x and r is one-to-one.
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manager incurs higher marginal cost from earnings management, which forces
him to decrease the amount of managed earnings.
We summarize the above properties about the amount of managed earnings
in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 The amount of managed earnings (1) increases with reported
earnings: @m=@r  0; (2) increases with future earnings growth: @m=@g  0;
(3) increases with the sensitivity of managers’ compensation to stock price:
@m=@a  0; and (4) decreases with the sensitivity of managers’ cost to the
amount of managed earnings: @m=@c  0.
Corollary 1 predicts that the amount of managed earnings increases with
reported earnings and future earnings growth. Extant empirical research has
documented a positive relation between the firm’s performance and discre-
tionary accruals from Jones models (see Dechow et al., 1995; Kasznik, 1999;
McNichols, 2000). McNichols (2000) also finds a positive relationship between
firm’s growth and discretionary accruals. The conventional explanation for the
above phenomena is that Jones models are mis-specified in identifying non-
discretionary accruals caused by performance increase or sales growth. Fol-
lowing researchers try to mitigate the mis-specification concern by adding
more controls. For example, DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) control cash
flows; Cheng and Warfield (2005) control earnings growth; Teoh et al. (1998a)
match on industry and net income, while DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) match
on year and industry; Kasznik (1999) adjusts the median discretionary accruals
with the same return on assets percentile; Kothari et al. (2005) propose to use
performance matched control sample to adjust discretionary accruals.
However the conclusion of mis-specification in discretionary accruals is
generally based on the assumption that the amount earnings management
should have no relation with reported earnings or earnings growth. Our model
provides an alternative explanation for the observed positive relationship, that
is, when the rational manager maximizes his price-related compensation, and
the market rationally adjust for the managed earnings, there exists a positive
relation between earnings management and the reported earnings or future
earnings growth.
Corollary 1 also predicts that the amount of managed earnings is positively
related to the sensitivity of compensation to stock price. Gao and Shrieves
(2002) find that earnings management is negatively related to salary and
positively related to option and restricted stocks in the compensation plan.
They also include measurement of the sensitivity of compensation to price
changes and find a significant relationship with earnings management.
Corollary 1 also predicts that the amount of managed earnings is negatively
associated with the sensitivity of managers’ cost to the amount of managed
earnings. Klein (2002) shows that the percentage of outsider directors on the
firm’s audit committee or board is negative related to the amount of managed
earnings. This evidence is consistent with the prediction that a good monitor
mechanism can impose higher cost to earnings management and help reduce
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earnings management.20 Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subrammanyam
(1998) document that firms with a big-6 auditor have smaller amount of
managed earnings. Barton and Simko (2002) find that accumulated earnings
management in the balance sheet constrains managers’ ability to manage
earnings.
3.2. The quality of reported earnings
In this section, we consider the relation between earnings quality and firm’s
reported earnings or growth. One commonly used definition of earnings
quality is the difference between reported earnings and true earnings.
According to this definition, firms with larger amount of managed earnings
have lower earnings quality. However according to our model, even though
firms with higher levels of true earnings choose a larger amount of managed
earnings, their managed earnings is only a smaller percentage of total reported
earnings (if everything else is the same). Since the price responsiveness is
decided by the marginal percentage of true earnings in reported earnings,
under the traditional definition firms with lower earnings quality (larger
amount of managed earnings) would have higher price responsiveness.
Our arguments can be illustrated by a simple example. Assume there are
two firms with the same total assets of 100. Firm A reports earnings as 20 while
firm B reports earnings as 5. Then Firm A and B have ROA equal to .2 and .05
respectively. Let us say within the reported earnings of firm A, the amount of
managed earnings is 2 while for firm B, 1.5 is managed earnings. From the
level of earnings management, firm A has higher managed earnings. However,
firm A has 10% of its earnings come from earnings management, while for
firm B, 30% of its earnings come from earnings management. As illustrated
above, the level of managed earnings may not be a good measure for earnings
quality when the amount of managed earnings is positively related to reported
earnings.
We define earnings quality as the proportion of true economic earnings in
total reported earnings:
q ¼ x
r
¼ 1  m
r
¼ 1   a
2cb
e
2cb
a r þ a
2cb
 
=r ð11Þ
Under our definition, firms with higher percentage of managed earnings in
total reported earnings have lower earnings quality. Our definition of earnings
quality explicitly considers the relation between earnings management and
reported earnings, and contrasts the part of managed earnings with the total
20 NYSE and NASDAQ modified their requirements for audit committees in December, which
now require that the listing firms have outsider directors at least on the audit committees. The new
requirements respond to the SEC’s call for improving the effectiveness of corporate audit com-
mittee in overseeing the financial reporting process.
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earnings. This definition is consistent with the price responsiveness to reported
earnings. In the following corollary, we provide the properties of the quality of
reported earnings.
Corollary 2 The quality of reported earnings measured by the proportion of
true earnings in total reported earnings (1) increases with reported earnings:
@q=@r  0; (2) decreases with future earnings growth: @q=@g  0; (3) de-
creases with the sensitivity of managers’ compensation to stock price:
@q=@a  0 and (4) increases with the sensitivity of managers’ cost to the
amount of managed earnings: @q=@c  0.
Proof See Appendix A.
In equilibrium, both the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of earnings
management increase with reported earnings. But the increasing speed of
marginal benefit is lower than the increasing speed of marginal cost. Every
additional dollar of increased reported earning contains a smaller amount of
managed earnings than the dollar before. The proportion of managed earnings
in total reported earnings decreases as reported earnings increases:
@m
@r
¼ e2cba r\1 ð12Þ
Researchers have also used the performance adjusted discretionary accru-
als as the measure of earnings quality.21 If the amount of managed earnings
increases with the reported earnings as illustrated in Corollary 1, this measure
would overstate the earnings quality of firms with higher performance.
Earnings quality decreases with the compensation coefficient and expected
future growth, because the marginal benefit of earnings management increases
with the compensation coefficient and firm’s growth. Moreover, because the
marginal cost of earnings management increases with the cost coefficient,
earnings quality increases with the cost coefficient.
3.3. Market response to reported earnings
In the revealing equilibrium, the market could unravel the exact amount of
managed earnings. For $1 increase in true earnings, the market would increase
the stock price by $1/b; but for $1 increase in managed earnings, the market
won’t change its valuation of the firm’s stock. Given that the proportional of
true earnings in total reported earnings increases as reported earnings rises,
we would expect a more sensitive market response to reported earnings
(higher price responsiveness). This is formally stated in the first part of
Corollary 3. Corollary 3 also summarizes the relation between price
21 For example: Francis, Lafond, Olsson, and Schipper (2002). They use performance adjusted
discretionary accruals as one of their measures of earnings quality.
123
318 C.-W. J. Lee et al.
responsiveness and future earnings growth, the compensation coefficient and
the cost coefficient.
Corollary 3 The sensitivity of market response to reported earnings, measured
as the first order derivative of price function with respect to reported earnings,
would (1) increase in reported earnings: @2p=@r2[0 (2) increase in future
earnings growth: @2p=@r@g  0 (3) decrease in the sensitivity of managers’
compensation to stock price: @2p=@r@a  0; (4) increase in the sensitivity of
managers’ cost to the amount of managed earnings: @2p=@r@c  0;
In Corollary 2, we have shown that with the rise of the cost coefficient or a
dropping of manager compensation coefficient, the proportion of managed
earnings in reported earnings will decrease, which causes an increase in price
responsiveness to reported earnings. Price responsiveness also increases with
future earnings growth. Although higher growth rate causes higher level of
earnings management, the market will still be more sensitive to earnings in-
crease of a high-growth firm, because a small amount of true earnings increase
today in a high-growth firm could bring lots of true earnings in the future.
The price function derived from our model is nonlinear and convex in
reported earnings, consistent with empirical evidence in Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997). Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) use a put option valuation
model to explain the convexity. They argue that when earnings/book value is
high, the firm will continue its current use of resources and earnings is more
important in determining equity value; while when earnings/book value is low,
the firm is more likely to exercise the option and adapt the assets to a more
efficient usage, therefore book value becomes more important in determining
equity value. Fischer and Verrecchia (1997) view equity as a call option. In
their model, equity holders with limited liability capture all upwards potential
of a positive movement in terminal value with limited downside risk, therefore
their response to ‘‘good’’ news is greater to ‘‘bad’’ news. Veronesi (1999)
studies a model in which risk-averse investors assess the firms’ risk through
past dividends pattern. He shows that investors’ willingness to ‘‘hedge’’
against changes in the level of uncertainty makes them overreact to bad news
in good times and under-react to good news in bad times, which makes the
price of the asset more sensitive to news in good times than in bad times. Our
model offers another potential explanation for the convexity of the price
function: Firms with higher reported earnings also have higher earnings
quality (lower percentage of managed earnings). When the market is efficient
in expecting earnings management, the price responsiveness will be higher for
firms with higher performance.
Our interpretation of the price responsiveness to reported earnings differs
from that of Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), in which price responsiveness is
used to measure earnings relevance (i.e. how much information about true
earnings can be reflected in price). They assume a linear pricing function and
demonstrate that when there is no uncertainty about managers’ motivations,
the market could back out the true earnings and the price responsiveness is a
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constant. In our model, we drop the assumption of linear pricing function. We
demonstrate that even when there is no uncertainty about managers’ objective
function and the market could fully back out the true earnings, the price
responsiveness still varies with other factors, because the marginal proportion
of true earnings in reported earnings varies with other factors.
4. Empirical tests
Our model provides several testable predictions about earnings management
and earnings quality. Our empirical tests focus on the influence of perfor-
mance or growth on the amount of managed earnings and earnings quality.
Specifically we test the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The amount of managed earnings increases with reported
earnings and expected future earnings growth;
Hypothesis 2 Earnings quality increases with reported earnings and decreases
with expected future earnings growth.
Prior empirical studies have provided supporting results for H1. However
the existing results are consistent with both the conventional explanation
(Jones models are mis-specified) and our rational expectation explanation.
Our empirical tests try to distinguish these two explanations by using refined
proxies for the amount for managed earnings. We carry out empirical tests on
two samples with different proxies for the amount of managed earnings. The
first sample contains all firm years during 1988–2001 with necessary infor-
mation and the proxy for the amount of managed earnings is the estimated
discretionary accruals from the KS (1995) model. KS (1995) mitigates the
omitted variables, simultaneity and error-in-variable problems by (1) directly
using costs of goods sold and other operating expenses as regressees; (2)
employing either the standard IV method or Hansen’s (1982) generalized
moment of method (GMM). The authors claim that their model is more
powerful and better specified than Jones models. The superiority of KS model
is confirmed by Thomas and Zhang (2000), who compare KS model with other
discretionary accruals detection models and find that KS provides the most
precise estimations. If a positive relation between discretionary accruals from
KS model and firms’ performance and growth exists, it would lessen the
concern of mis-specification. The second sample contains data from restate-
ment announcements that are identified as the results of accounting irregu-
larities between January 1, 1997 and June 30, 2002. The proxy for the amount
of managed earnings is the restated amount of earnings hand-collected from
the restatement announcements. Because the restated amount usually comes
from investigations conducted by outside auditors, the SEC, or firms’ internal
auditors, it is unlikely to have the same type of measurement errors caused by
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model mis-specification. If the positive relation between the restated amount
and firms’ performance and growth holds in the restatement sample, it would
provide a strong support for our rational explanation.
Hypothesis 2 has not been tested before. Our empirical tests on Hypoth-
esis 2 are also carried out in the two samples as described above. Since the
mis-specification explanation does not predict the properties of earnings
quality, any evidence consistent with Hypothesis 2 would support our rational
expectation explanation.
Each proxy has advantages and disadvantages. The proxy from KS model
enables us to employ a large sample, which increases the power of our tests.
However we cannot rule out the possibility that the estimation of earnings
management from KS (1995) model remains biased. The proxy from the
restatement data is less subject to measurement error. However the sample is
limited to firms that have restated before. Firms that have not been detected
and those that manipulate earnings within GAAP are neglected. The
restatement sample size is small and the testing power is weak. Though both
proxies are imperfect, we gain more confidence if tests using two proxies
provide consistent evidence.
4.1. Tests on the large sample
Our large sample combines data from Compustat and I/B/E/S. Financial data
for estimating discretionary accrual are obtained from Compustat during
1988–2001. We require firms to satisfy the following selection criteria: (1) The
firm is not a utility firm (SIC 4400–5000) or a financial institution (SIC 6000–
6999); (2) The firm has price and shares outstanding data to calculate market
value at the year end; and (3) There are at least 10 observations in the same
industry, defined using two-digit SIC codes. Utilities firms are excluded be-
cause they are subject to regulation and financial institutions are excluded
because their financial reporting environment differs from that of industrial
firms. The requirement of market value ensures that firms are listed, so
managers can benefit from the increase of market price through earnings
management, as we assumed in the model. The third requirement ensures that
we have enough observations for estimating discretionary accruals from KS
model. We obtain long-term earnings growth forecasts from I/B/E/S as the
proxy for expected earnings growth rates.
After the estimation of discretionary accruals, we restrict our sample to
firms with positive net income. Our reasons for the restriction are as follows.
First, according to the equilibrium in our model, when reported earnings is
less than 0, the manager doesn’t manage earnings up and the market price has
0 sensitivity to the change of reported earnings. Second, our predictions are
made within the context when economic earnings is permanent and have a
constant growth rate. According to the existing empirical evidence, when
reported earnings is negative, they signal little content about the economic
earnings. Hayn (1995) shows that negative earnings is transient while positive
earnings is more persistent. Basu (1997) finds that negative earnings is more
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likely to reverse. Third, when firms perform poorly, they may want to manage
earnings down to take a big bath (see Kirschenheiter & Melumad, 2002),
which is inconsistent with our assumption that managers have incentives to
manipulate earnings upwards. Fourth, our model assumes that stock prices are
decided by reported earnings. When the earnings is negative, the market
prices are more related to book value instead of earnings (Collins, Pincus, &
Xie, 1999). Finally, our definition of earnings quality requires reported
earnings to be positive.
We use KS model to estimate the amount of managed earnings. Specifi-
cally, we run a regression using GMM in each year and two-digit SIC code
category if there are 10 observations or more in that category. The dependent
variable and independent variables in previous 2 years are used as instru-
mental variables for GMM estimation.
ACCLt
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¼c0 þ c1 REVt
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REVt1
 
þ c2 EXPt
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þ e 22t
The amount of managed earnings is the error term from the model.
Earnings quality is calculated as the negative of the amount of managed
earnings divided by return of assets. Note our sample includes observations
with negative discretionary accruals. Though our model only predicts positive
earnings management, the structure of KS model implies that the discre-
tionary accruals (as an error term) should have mean of zero. Therefore we
use discretionary accruals from KS to measure the relative degree of earnings
management instead of the actual amount of managed earnings.23 Following
McNichols (2000), we use long-term earnings growth forecasts24 from I/B/E/S
as the proxy for the expected future earnings growth.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our sample. We have 13,164
observations from 1991 to 2001. The median of long-term earnings growth rate
is 15.08%. The median of the amount of discretionary accruals is around 1%
of total assets. ROA is around 7%. The median of earnings quality is around
)14%, which means the median proportion of discretionary accruals in
reported earnings is around 14%. Panel B presents correlation matrix between
variables. EM is negatively related to EQ, which means higher earnings
management firms have lower earnings quality. Although the correlation is
strong ().569), they are not the same. EQ explicitly considers the reported
22 See appendix for the description of variables. Thomas and Zhang (2000) use KS model in
pooled sample. We use cross-sectional version of KS, similar to cross-sectional version of Jones
model. Our total accruals are calculated from statement of cash flow. Using balance sheet method
does not change the results.
23 If we exclude firms with negative discretionary accruals, our results are qualitatively the same
but stronger.
24 We use the median of long-term growth forecasts in the last month of each fiscal year.
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earnings, and contrasts the managed earnings with the whole reported earn-
ings. The correlations between EM and ROA or LG are both significantly
positive, which is consistent with our hypotheses. The correlation between EQ
and ROA is significantly positive and the correlation between EQ and LG is
significantly negative, which is also consistent with our hypotheses.
Table 2 presents the results from regression of the level of earnings man-
agement or earnings quality on ROA and long-term growth. Hypotheses 1
and 2 predict that the amount of managed earnings should be positively
related to ROA and future earnings growth while earnings quality should be
positively related to ROA and negatively related to earnings growth. We find
positive and significant ( P\:001) coefficients on both ROA and earnings
growth in regression (1), where the amount of managed earnings is the
dependent variable. We also find a positive and significant ( P\:001)
coefficient on ROA and a negative and significant ( P\:001) coefficient on
long-term earnings growth in regression (2), where earnings quality is the
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the large sample
Year No. of
sample firms
EM earnings
management
EQ earnings
quality
ROA returns
on assets
LG long-term
growth forecast
Panel A. Description of variables by year
1991 868 .01 ).19 .07 14.44
1992 863 .01 ).14 .07 14.75
1993 938 .01 ).08 .07 15.00
1994 1060 .00 ).04 .08 15.00
1995 1131 .01 ).07 .08 15.00
1996 1312 .01 ).10 .08 15.00
1997 1442 .01 ).13 .08 16.04
1998 1413 .01 ).14 .08 16.50
1999 1546 .01 ).12 .07 15.90
2000 1472 .02 ).21 .08 16.46
2001 1119 .02 ).30 .06 15.63
Whole sample 13,164 .01 ).14 .07 15.08
Panel B. Correlation between variables
EQ ROA LG
EM ).569 .059 .089
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001)
EQ .064 ).026
(<.001) (.003)
ROA .291
(<.001)
The samples consist of 13,164 firm year observations with sufficient data to estimate discretionary
accruals using a cross-sectional version of KS (1995) model. The sample period cover 12 years
from 1991 through 2001. Utility firms (SIC: 4400–4999) and financial firms (6000–6999) are ex-
cluded. The sample only includes firm years with positive net income. EM is the amount of
managed earnings estimated from the KS (1995) model. EQ is earnings quality, defined as the
negative of the proportion of managed earnings in net income. ROA is net income divided by total
asset at the beginning of fiscal year. LG is analysts’ forecasts of long-term earnings growth rates
from I/B/E/S. Panel A presents median of each variable by year. Panel B presents the correlation
between variables. We have winsorized the sample at 1 and 99% for each of the variables
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dependent variable.25 The results support both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothe-
sis 2. As a robust check, we also run rank regressions and the results are
qualitatively the same.
4.2. Tests on the restatement sample
Our restatement sample combines data from firms’ restatement announce-
ments, Compustat and I/B/E/S. Data on restatements is constructed based on
the General Accounting Office (GAO)’s report: ‘‘Financial Statement
Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Response, and Remaining
Challenges.’’ The GAO report includes a listing of 919 restatements that are
identified as the results of accounting irregularities between January 1, 1997
and June 30, 2002. The types of accounting irregularities include so-called
‘‘aggressive’’ accounting practices, intentional and unintentional misuses of
facts applied to financial statements, oversight or mis-interpretation of
accounting rules, and fraud (see GAO-03-138 for detail description of defi-
nition and procedures). Prior studies have used the occurrence of this type of
restatements as the evidence that firms committed earnings management.26 In
our paper, we use the restated amount (reported earnings announced
initially—reported earnings restated) as the proxy for the amount of managed
earnings.
The GAO database includes company name, ticker symbol, the date of the
announcement, the entity that prompted the restatement, and the reason(s) for
the restatement. However, it does not report the amount of restatements and
Table 2 The regression of EM or EQ on performance and growth-large sample
Independent variable EM EQ
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
Intercept ).340 .049 ).271 <.001
ROA 3.994 <.001 3.297 <.001
LG .079 <.001 ).019 <.001
Number of observations 13,164 13,164
R-square .89% .61%
The samples consist of 13,164 firm year observations with sufficient data to estimate a cross-
sectional version of KS (1995) model. The sample period cover 12 years from 1991 till 2001. Utility
firms (SIC: 4400–4999) and financial firms (6000–6999) are excluded. The sample only includes
firm years with positive net income. EM is the amount of managed earnings estimated from the KS
(1995) model. EQ is earnings quality, defined as the negative of the proportion of managed
earnings in net income. ROA is net income divided by total asset at the beginning of fiscal year.
LG is analysts’ estimation of long-term earnings growth rates from I/B/E/S. We have winsorized
the sample at 1 and 99% for each of the variables. For the regression (1) coefficients are presented
as 100 times the original amount
25 For tests of earnings quality, we also use the cross-sectional version of Jones model (as the way
used in Becker et al., 1998; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996). We reach the same
conclusions.
26 For instance, see Agarwal and Chadha (2003), Beasley (1996), Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins
(2004), Farber (2005), Richardson, Tuna, and Wu (2002), and Srinivasan (2005).
123
324 C.-W. J. Lee et al.
the financial periods on which the restatements affect. We search Lexis–Nexis
for each restatement announcement included in GAO’s report,27 and identify
the restated amount and the affected fiscal periods. We then merge the
restatement data with Compustat to get necessary financial information.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the restatement sample
Firm-years
affected
Announcements
Panel A: Data loss during the sample collection
Number of firms from GAO’s report 919
Firms not in CRSP 245
No restatement amounts found 390
Restatement unrelated to annual report 166
228 118
The effects on earnings not identified 69
The reported earnings is not positive
or not available in Compustat
49
The restated amount is positive 19
Final sample 91 (67 firms)
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of variables
Variable N Mean Median SD Min Max
EM_Restated 91 .014 .006 .022 .001 .102
EQ_Restated 91 ).407 ).161 .632 ).001 )2.918
ROA 91 .059 .046 .055 .002 .255
LG 91 18.610 18.083 7.096 2.500 40.000
Panel C. Correlation between variables
EQ_Restated ROA LG
EM_Restated ).425 (<.001) .209 (.047) .111 (.297)
EQ_Restated .275 (.008) .044 (.677)
ROA .214 (.042)
The sample consists of firm-years affected by restatement announcements identified between 1997
and 2002 as results of previous ‘‘aggressive accounting’’ practice. Based on GAO’s report, we hand
collect the available restated fiscal year and restated amount of earnings from the firms’
restatement announcements on Lexis–Nexis. We require each observation to have a clearly
specified amount of restated annual net income, positive reported earnings and negative earnings
restatements (firms had managed earnings upwards.) Our final restatement sample consists of 91
firms years (67 firms). EM_Restated is defined as the restated amounts (reported earnings an-
nounced initially—reported earnings restated) divided by previous total assets, EQ_Restated is
defined as the negative of the proportion of restated amount in initially stated net income, ROA is
net income divided by total assets, LG is analysts’ estimation of long-term earnings growth rates
from I/B/E/S. To mitigate the problem of losing observations, we replace LG as industry median
LG if the firm specific LG is not available. Panel A shows the reasons for data loss during the
sample collection. Panel B shows the basic statistics for variables and Panel C presents the cor-
relation matrix of our variables. All variables have been winsorized at top and bottom 3%
27 Using the Lexis–Nexis ‘‘Guided News Search’’ command and the ‘‘News Wire’’ database, we
performed a keyword search using ‘‘restate,’’ ‘‘restated,’’ in the full text and the key word in the
company’s name in the headline. We further require the date of the news to be within 3 days
around the announcement date from GAO’s report.
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During the data collection process, we notice that many firms do not have a
definite amount of restatement; some restatements affect only quarterly data;
some restatements affect revenues and/or expenses but not earnings.
Reasons for reduction of observations during the collection process are
presented in Panel A of Table 3. We also require observations to have posi-
tive reported earnings and earnings decreasing restatements (firms had
managed earnings upwards). The final sample includes 91 firm years with 67
different firms. We note that there are only 19 cases of earnings increasing
restatement, in contrast to 91 cases with earnings decreasing restatement. This
suggests that most of firms are managing earnings upwards, which is consistent
with our assumption.
For the restatement sample, the proxy for the amount of managed earnings
(EM_Restated) is defined as restated amount deflated by the beginning total
assets, and earnings quality (EQ_Restated) is defined as negative of restated
amount divided by initially reported earnings. We still use ROA as the proxy
for firm performance and long-term earnings growth forecasts from I/B/E/S as
the proxy for the future growth. To mitigate the problem of losing more
observations, we use the 2-digit industry median of long-term earnings growth
forecasts if firms’ specific forecasts are not available. Panel B of Table 3
presents descriptive statistics for the restatement sample. We notice that the
performance of the restated firms have lower performance (median of
ROA = .046) compared to the previous sample (median of ROA = .070),
inconsistent with our hypothesis that earnings management increases with
performance. The earnings growth is higher in restated sample (median of
LG = 18.08) than in the previous sample (median of LG = 15.08), consistent
with our hypothesis that earnings management increase with earnings growth.
However we do not conduct rigorous tests to compare restated firms with
non-restated firms. Richardson et al. (2002) find that restated firms are not
different from non-restated firms in earnings performance, but average growth
rate of restated firms are higher.
In Table 4, we regress EM_Restated and EQ_Restated respectively on
performance and growth. The results are mixed. The amount of managed
earnings is positively related to performance and earnings quality is also
positively related to performance. Both are significant at 5% level. This is
consistent with our predictions and tests’ results on the large sample. How-
ever, we do not find significant relations between firms’ growth and earnings
management or earnings quality. As a robustness check, we also use market-
to-book ratios (M/B) to measure the expected earnings growth. The coeffi-
cients on M/B are not significant either.
4.3. Discussions of empirical results
Taken as a whole, our prediction that performance is positively related to
earnings management or earnings quality is supported by results from both
samples. However, our prediction that growth is positively related to earnings
management and negatively related to earnings quality is only supported by
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tests results on the large sample but not by results on the restatement sample.
A possible reason for the insignificance is the low test power caused by the
small restatement sample.
The evidence that discretionary accruals are positively related to perfor-
mance and growth is consistent with Dechow et al. (1995) and McNichols
(2000). The conventional explanations for this relationship are mis-specifica-
tion of Jones model. Our model suggests that the relationship may be results
from rational activities of the market and managers. Our empirical results
using measurement from KS model or restated amount are consistent with our
theory. Though we cannot exclude the possibility that KS model is also biased,
the measurement using restated amount should be free of the same kind of
measurement bias. Our model suggests another explanation for the relation-
ship between earnings management, performance and growth.28
Our study has implications for empirical studies in earnings management.
To measure the amount of managed earnings, some researchers directly use
performance or growth as the regressees or use performance matched control
sample to filter out the performance effects. Our model suggests that
performance and growth are important factors affecting the amount of man-
aged earnings. Fully filtering out the discretionary accrual associated with
performance or growth will not only reduce the test power but also biases
Table 4 The regressions of EM or EQ on performance and growth-restatement sample
Independent variable EM_Restate EQ_Restate
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
Intercept .012 .348 ).631 .081
ROA .086 .047 3.126 .010
LG ).001 .825 .002 .910
Number of observations 91 91
R-square 2.25% 5.50%
The sample consists of firm-years affected by restatement announcements identified between 1997
and 2002 as results of previous ‘‘aggressive accounting’’ practice. Based on GAO’s report, we hand
collect the available restated fiscal year and restated amount of earnings from the firms’ restate-
ment announcements on Lexis–Nexis. We require each observation to have a clearly specified
amount of restated annual net income, positive reported earnings and negative earnings restate-
ments (firms had managed earnings upwards.) Our final restatement sample consists of 91 firms
years (67 firms). EM_Restated is defined as the restated amounts (reported earnings announced
initially—reported earnings restated) divided by previous total assets, EQ_Restated is defined as
the negative of the proportion of restated amount in initially stated net income, ROA is net income
divided by total assets. LG is analysts’ estimation of long-term earnings growth rates from I/B/E/S.
To mitigate the problem of losing observations, we replace LG as industry median LG if the firm
specific LG is not available. All variables have been winsorized at top and bottom 3%
28 Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson (2003) examine the relation between discretionary loss reserve
accruals and the distribution of reported earnings for a sample of property-casualty insurers. They
find that the least profitable firms understate reserves relative to the most profitable firms, which
contradicts our prediction and findings.
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downwards the amount of managed earnings for firms with better performance
or higher growth.29 Our model suggests whether performance or growth should
be controlled depends on research objectives. If the research objective is to
measure the level of earnings management and link it to market efficiency or
compare earnings management level among individual firms within a sample
(e.g. all IPO firms), eliminating the effect of performance or growth may result
in a biased measure. If the research objective is to test whether some events
(e.g. IPO or SEO) trigger higher level of earnings management, controlling
firms’ performance and growth would be necessary. In this case, even if as we
predict, firms’ performance and growth affect the amount of managed earn-
ings, not controlling them would cause the omitted variable problem when the
occurrence of events is correlated with firms’ performance or growth. In event
studies, the emphasis is on the relation between earnings management and the
occurrence of the event, not on the accurate measure of earnings management
level. This point is clearly stated in Dechow et al. (1995). Our model also
suggests that the relationship between the magnitude of earnings management
and firm’s performance and growth are not linear. Therefore controlling
performance and growth in an OLS regression may result in biased estimation
of discretionary accrual due to model mis-specification. Performance and
growth matched control sample would probably do a better job if data allows
(see Kothari et al., 2005).
5. Conclusions
Using a simple reporting model, we demonstrate that firms with higher per-
formance or expected earnings growth over-report earnings by a larger
amount because price responsiveness in equilibrium increases with earnings
performance or growth. Our model suggests another explanation for the
documented relationship between discretionary accruals and performance and
growth. We further suggest that fully filtering out the discretionary accruals
associated with performance or growth would bias the estimate for the
amount of managed earnings. We define earnings quality as the proportion of
true economic earnings in reported earnings. Under our definition, firms with
higher earnings quality have higher price responsiveness. We predict that
earnings quality is positively related to reported earnings and negatively
related to expected growth. Our model also offers an alternative explanation
to the phenomenon that the price is convex in reported earnings. In our
setting, firms with higher reported earnings have higher earnings quality
therefore receive higher price responsiveness. Our empirical tests, using
two proxies for the amount of managed earnings, confirm our predictions
29 Kothari et al. (2005) also notice the reduced power of performance matching. See their dis-
cussion at Page 170. However, our model suggests the performance matching may also produce
biases results conditional on different performance or growth.
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concerning firms’ performance. However, we get mixed empirical results for
predictions concerning expected future earnings growth.
Future research can build on our study to further understand the rela-
tionship between earnings management and firms’ performance and expected
growth. Our simple theoretical model could not address the inter-temporal
nature of earnings management. Future research could generalize our model
to a multi-period setting. In our model, earnings reporting only affect inves-
tors’ perception of performance level. It would be more interesting it also
affects investors’ perception of earnings growth. Our empirical tests are lim-
ited by the difficulty in finding an appropriate proxy (readily available and
free of bias) for the amount of managed earnings. A large sample size with
such a proxy would provide more convincing evidence on the relationship
between earnings management and firm’s performance and future earnings
growth.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Using Eqs. 1–4, we get the differential equation:
ap0r þ 2cbp  2cr ¼ 0 ðA:1Þ
where r  0, and b ¼ d  g=1 þ d. The general solution for Eq. A.1 is:
pðrÞ ¼ Ge2cba r þ r
b
 a
2cb2
ðA:2Þ
Using the initial condition pðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ 0, we get G ¼ a=2cb2. We plug G back
into Eq. A.2, and get:
pðrÞ ¼ a
2cb2
e
2cb
a r þ r
b
 a
2cb2
ðA:3Þ
Eq. A.3 gives the equilibrium pricing function when reported earnings is
positive.
Plugging (A.3) back to the objective function of the manager, we could
show that the utility of the manager is concave in r when r  0; i.e.,
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2c e
2cb
a r  1
 
 0
For any r  0. Therefore, the first order condition is sufficient for a global
maximum.
Proof of @m@a ¼ 1  1 þ ra
 	
e
r
a  0where a ¼ a=2cb. Let gðrÞ ¼ @m@a , then
gðr ¼ 0Þ ¼ 0. And g0ðrÞ ¼ ra e
r
a. When r[0; g0ðrÞ[0. So for all r  0; @m@a  0.
Proof of Corollary 2 Notice that the sign of @q@a would be the same as the sign
of @m@a when r  0, where a ¼ a2cb, and b ¼ dg1þd. Given @m@a  0, it is obvious that
when r  0; @q@a  0. Now we prove that @q@r  0: Take derivative of Eq. 11, we
get:
@q
@r
¼ a
2cbr2
e
2cbr
a  A
where
A ¼ e2cbra  2cbr
a
 1
 
Because a
2cbr2
e
2cbr
a [0, @q@r has the same sign as A. Because when r ¼ 0; A ¼ 0.
And when r[0, @A@r [0, we get A  0, when r  0. For the above reasoning,
@q
@r  0.
Proof of Corollary 3 From Eq. A.3, we get:
@2p
@r2
¼ 2c
a
e
2cb
a r;
@2p
@r@a
¼  2cr
a3
e
2cb
a r;
@2p
@r@c
¼ 2r
a
e
2cb
a r
Obviously, @
2p
@r2
[0. And when r  0, @2p@r@a  0 and @
2p
@r@c  0 From Eq. A.3, we get:
@2p
@r@b
¼ 2c
ab
e
2cbr
a  B
where
B ¼ r  a
2bc
e
2cbr
a þ a
2bc
 
Since 2cab e
2cbra [0, @
2p
@r@b has the same sign as B. Because when r ¼ 0; B ¼ 0, and
when r[0, @B@r \0. We get B  0, when r  0. For the above reason, @
2p
@r@b  0
and @
2p
@r@g  0.
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Appendix B
ACCL = Net Income (#172)-Operating Cash flow (#308)
ART = Accounts receivable (#2) less Tax receivables (#161)
EXP = expenses = Revenue (#12)- Operating income before depreciation
(#13)
DEP = Depreciation from Income Statement (#14)
OCAL = other current assets and liabilities = Current assets (#4)-ART-Cash
(#1)- Income tax refund (#161)-(Current liabilities (#5)- Income taxes payable
(#71)
GPPE = gross plant, property and equipment (#7)
TA = Total assets (#6)
REV = Revenues (#12)
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